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Abstract
The Shapley value is commonly illustrated by roll call votes in which players support or
reject a proposal in sequence. If all sequences are equiprobable, a voter’s Shapley value can
be interpreted as the probability of being pivotal, i.e., to bring about the required majority
or to make this impossible for others. We characterize the joint probability distributions
over cooperation patterns that permit this roll call interpretation: individual votes may be
interdependent but must be exchangeable.
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1 Introduction
A player’s Shapley value equals its expected contribution to surplus creation if
full cooperation among players is established in random order. Going back to
Shapley (1953) and Shapley and Shubik (1954), this is often illustrated by voting
games: shareholders, delegates to a council, parties, etc. cast their respective voting
weight in favor of a proposal one after another. If player i’s vote is the first to reach
the required majority threshold, it ‘swings’ the status of the coalition S of earlier
supporters from losing (v(S) = 0) to winning (v(S ∪ {i}) = 1); i is then attributed a
‘marginal contribution’ of v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) = 1. Averaging these contributions across
all equiprobable voting sequences yields i’s Shapley value ϕi(v). It is equal to the
probability that i is decisive for passing a proposal. This is commonly interpreted as
voting power and also called i’s Shapley-Shubik index (SSI).
The implicit assumption in this well-known roll call interpretation of Shapley value
andSSI is that all voters support the proposal, i.e., everyplayer joins the coalition either
sooner or later. This was criticized early on, e.g., by Luce and Raiffa (1957, p. 255). It
is still not widely known that the roll call interpretation of the Shapley value extends
considerably beyond uniform “yes” votes.
Namely, a voter can also be decisive for rejecting a proposal by voting “no”
and being first to ensure that the required majority cannot be met. In general,
we say player i is pivotal in a given voting sequence if the collective decision may
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still go either way before i’s vote but becomes fully determined by it. Already
Mann and Shapley (1960, p. 4; 1964, p. 153) observed that player i’s SSI equals i’s
pivot probability if all players vote in a mutually independent way with a common
probability x ∈ [0, 1] for “yes”, not just when x = 1 or 0. This was first explicitly proven
in Felsenthal and Machover (1996).
But ϕi(v)’s roll call interpretation applies even more generally: it is sufficient that
players’ votes are exchangeable, so possibly dependent. This can be deduced from
combinatorial results by Hu (2006, Prop. 4). We give a short non-combinatorial proof
here. Our main objective, however, is to show that exchangeability is necessary, too:
i’s Shapley value equals its pivot probability in roll call votes with random order if and
only if players’ cooperation decisions are exchangeable.
A characterization of when pivotality in role calls reduces to the Shapley value is
of interest beyond committee decisions: binary threshold structures similar to voting
appear in diverse contexts. Think, e.g., of dichotomous stability assessments in which
loans that are either performingornon-performingplay the role of votes and exceeding
a given quota of non-performing loans reflects insolvency. And if the usual definition
of i’smarginal contribution is extended to reflect also the reduction of creatable surplus
if i refuses to cooperate, then the roll call interpretation of the Shapley value extends
to general coalitional games without full cooperation too.
2 Preliminaries
Consider a set N = {1, . . . , n} of n > 0 players. A coalitional game v : 2N → R with
v(∅) = 0 maps each coalition S ⊆ N of cooperating players to a real number, typically
interpreted as a surplus that increases from zero to v(N) as more players cooperate. In
voting applications, i ∈ S reflects a “yes” vote by player i. Then the focus is on simple
(voting) games with v(S) ∈ {0, 1}: v(S) = 1 identifies passage of a proposal, v(∅) = 0,
v(N) = 1, and S ⊆ T ⇒ v(S) ≤ v(T). Simple games uT defined by uT(S) = 1 ⇔ T ⊆ S
for given ∅ , T ⊆ N are called unanimity games and form a basis of the vector space of
coalitional games.
Values are operators that map coalitional games to Rn and thereby suggest an
allocation of v(N), indicate the distribution of voting power, etc. A value ψ is called
linear if ψ(α · u + β · v) = α · ψ(u) + β · ψ(v) for all constants α, β ∈ R and all coalitional
games u, v on the same setN of agents, where
(
α · u + β · v
)
(S) = α ·u(S)+ β · v(S) for all
S ⊆ N. ψ is called efficient if
∑
i∈N ψi(v) = v(N). A player i ∈ N satisfying v(S) = v(S∪{i})
for all S ⊆ N \ {i} is called null. If ψi(v) = 0 whenever i is a null player in v, then
ψ satisfies the null player property. Players i, j ∈ N with v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ { j}) for all
S ⊆ N \ {i, j} are called equivalent. ψ is symmetric if ψi(v) = ψ j(v) whenever i, j ∈ N are
equivalent in v.
Denote the set of all permutations ofN by Sn and let P
pi
i
be the set of all agents that
precede i in order pi ∈ Sn. Then the Shapley value ϕ is defined by
ϕi(v) =
1
n!
·
∑
pi∈Sn
[
v
(
Ppii ∪ {i}
)
− v
(
Ppii
)]
for all i ∈ N. (1)
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This can also be written and more efficiently be computed as
ϕi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|! · (n − |S| − 1)!
n!
· [v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)] , (2)
i.e., by summing only over 2n−1 coalitions instead of n! permutations. Shapley (1953)
proved that ϕ is the unique value that satisfies efficiency, linearity, symmetry, and the
null player property.
Shapley also gave eq. (1) a roll call interpretation: assume that all players consent
to cooperate one after the other. Given an ordering pi ∈ Sn, player i’s effect on the joint
surplus at the time when i decides is v
(
Ppi
i
∪ {i}
)
− v
(
Ppi
i
)
. Considering all orderings to
be equiprobable and taking expectations gives eq. (1).
Shapley and Shubik (1954, p. 789)mentioned for simple games that one can equiv-
alently arrive at ϕi(v) assuming all players vote “no”. If a player decides not to
cooperate in a coalitional game, then formation of the grand coalitionN is blocked; the
player rescinds some surplus thatmight potentially be created. At the time of choosing
not to cooperate, the size of this destructive effect of player i’s non-cooperation is
v
(
N \ Ppii
)
− v
(
N \
(
Ppii ∪ {i}
))
= v∗
(
Ppii ∪ {i}
)
− v∗
(
Ppii
)
, (3)
where v∗(S) := v(N)− v(N \ S) for all S ⊆ N defines the dual game of v and ϕ(v∗) = ϕ(v).
Allowing cooperation (“yes”) by some players and non-cooperation (“no”) by oth-
ers gives rise to a generalized roll call model that was introduced by Mann and Shapley
(1960, p. 4; 1964, p. 153) and taken up by Felsenthal and Machover (1996): an ordering
pi of players is determined; each player i ∈ N is called in order; when called, i decides
either to cooperate or not. Denoting the resultingfinal sets of cooperators or supporters
of a motion by S and the non-cooperators by S := N \ S, the actual surplus created is
v(S); the potential surplus rescinded is v∗(S) = v(N) − v(S). A particular instance of a
roll call will be referred to as R = (pi, S) for pi ∈ Sn and S ∈ 2
N.
To assess the effect of a given player i in this process of (non-)creation in game v,
let Y(R, i) denote the set of cooperative players j ∈ S that precede player i. Similarly,
let N(R, i) collect all uncooperative players j ∈ S that precede i. We can then define
the marginal contribution of player i in roll call R for game v as
M(v,R, i) =
{
v(Y(R, i) ∪ {i}) − v(Y(R, i)) if i ∈ S,
v∗(N(R, i) ∪ {i}) − v∗(N(R, i)) if i ∈ S.
(4)
For a simple game v,M(v,R, i) ∈ {0, 1} andM(v,R, i) = 1 if and only if player i is pivotal
in R: fate of a given proposal is still open before i’s vote but sealed by i’s decision.
Player i’s overall effect or power in game v can be captured by computing its
expected marginal contribution for an appropriate distribution over roll calls. We stay
in line with eq. (1) by presuming that orderings are drawn independently from the
uniform distribution on Sn. However, we define value ϕ
p by
ϕ
p
i
(v) =
1
n!
∑
pi∈Sn
∑
S∈2N
p(S) ·M(v, (pi, S), i) for i ∈ N (5)
for an arbitrary probability distribution p on 2N, i.e., requiring only p(S) ≥ 0 for all
S ∈ 2N and
∑
S∈2N p(S) = 1. Cooperation of players thus neither needs to be complete
with p(N) = 1, nor independent with p(S) =
∏
i∈S xi
∏
i<S(1 − xi) for xi ∈ [0, 1].
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3 Results
Proposition 1 Value ϕp is linear, efficient, and satisfies the null player property for every
probability distribution p.
Proof The null player property is obvious from the definition. Linearity follows from
recalling that v∗(N(R, i)∪ {i})− v∗(N(R, i)) = v(N \N(R, i))− v(N \ (N(R, i)∪ {i})). So ϕp
is a linear combination of terms that are linear in v. For efficiency, first observe that
n∑
i=1
M(v,R, i) = v(S) − v(∅) + v∗(S) − v∗(∅) = v(N) − v(∅) = v(N) (6)
for any R ∈ Sn × 2
N given the telescope sum behavior of
∑n
i=1 M(v,R, i). Second,
|Sn| = n! and
∑
S∈2N p(S) = 1. 
RandomvariablesX1, . . . ,Xn are called exchangeable or symmetrically dependent if the
n! permutations (Xk1 , . . . ,Xkn) all have the same n-dimensional probability distribution
(see, e.g., Feller 1971, sec. 7.4). Applied to votes or binary cooperation choices, which
ϕp treats as random variables, this is equivalent to p(S) = p(S′) whenever |S| = |S′|, i.e.,
the probability of a particular partition ofN into cooperators S and non-cooperators S
depends only on the number of (non-)cooperators rather than their identities.
Proposition 2 If players’ cooperation choices are exchangeable under p then ϕp is symmetric.
Proof Let κ denote the permutation that swaps players i and j and define κ(R) =
(κ(pi), κ(S)) for any given roll call R = (pi, d). If i and j are equivalent then M(v,R, i) =
M(v, κ(R), j) for all R. Exchangeability implies p(S) = p(κ(S)). Hence
ϕ
p
i
(v) =
1
n!
∑
pi∈Sn
∑
S∈2N
p(S) ·M(v, (pi, S), i) =
1
n!
∑
pi∈Sn
∑
S∈2N
p(κ(S)) ·M(v, κ(pi, S), j) (7)
=
1
n!
∑
pi′∈Sn
∑
S′∈2N
p(S′) ·M(v, (pi′, S′), j) = ϕ
p
j
(v).

Proposition 1 and the characterization ofϕ by Shapley (1953) then give the generaliza-
tion of Felsenthal and Machover’s (1996) result by Hu (2006, Prop. 4) as an immediate
corollary: if players’ cooperation choices are exchangeable under p then ϕp(v) = ϕ(v)
for all coalitional games v.1 We here show that the converse holds too:
Proposition 3 If ϕp is symmetric then players’ cooperation choices are exchangeable under p.
Proof We need to prove that |S| = |S′| ⇒ p(S) = p(S′) if ϕp is symmetric. This is satisfied
trivially if n = 1, S = ∅, or S = N since then S = S′. So consider n ≥ 2, S ∈ 2N \ {∅,N}
and S , S′. The symmetric difference S∆S′ := {i ∈ N : i < S ∩ S′} contains between
2 and 2 · |S| members. But there always exists a finite path (X1, . . . ,Xr) with X1 = S
1A special case of Hu’s result, namely ϕp(v) = ϕ(v) if p(S) = 2−n for all S ⊆ N, was published by
Bernardi and Freixas (2018). A combinatorial proof of Hu’s result also is contained in Kurz (2016).
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and Xr = S
′ such that Xl and Xl+1 differ by just one player i ∈ Xl being replaced by
some j < Xl, i.e., Xl∆Xl+1 = {i, j}. To prove the claim, it therefore suffices to show that
symmetry of ϕp implies p(X ∪ {i}) = p(X ∪ { j}) for every set X ⊆ N \ {i, j} and i , j ∈ N.
Fix any such set X ⊆ N \ {i, j} and let us consider the game
vX =
∑
{i, j}⊆T⊆N
λT,X · uT, (8)
where λT,X = M
−1
X,(T\{i, j})
invokes the inverse matrixM−1 specified as follows:
Lemma 1 Let M be the 2m × 2m matrix M defined by MR,S =
1
1+|R\S|
for all R, S ⊆ G, where G
is a set of cardinality m. Then M’s inverse M−1 is given by
M−1R,S =
(
m + 1
m + |R \ S|
)
· (−1)|S∆R|. (9)
Proof of Lemma 1 is provided in the appendix. Game vX is chosen such that its
coordinates λT,X in the unanimity game basis {uT} of the space of coalitional games
satisfy
∑
{i, j}⊆T⊆N
λT,X ·
1
1 + |(T \ {i, j}) \ S|
=M−1X,(T\{i, j}) ·M(T\{i, j}),S =

0, S , X,
1, S = X
(10)
for any given set S ⊆ N \ {i, j}. This follows from Lemma 1 using G = N \ {i, j} and
R = T \ {i, j}. Since vX is a linear combination of unanimity games uT in that i and j are
equivalent, they are equivalent in vX.
For any unanimity game uT with i, j ∈ T, value ϕ
p
i
(uT) captures pivotality of i in
two situations: if i ∈ S, then i is pivotal in roll call R = (pi, S) iff all players in T vote
“yes” (so T ⊆ S) and i is the last member of T to be called; if i < S, then player i is
pivotal iff i is the first member of T to be called. If we divide the latter roll calls with
i < S according to whether j ∈ S or j < S, we have
ϕ
p
i
(uT) =
∑
T⊆S⊆N
1
|T|
· p(S) +
∑
S⊆N\{i, j}
1
|T \ S|
· p(S) +
∑
S⊆N\{i, j}
1
|T \ S| − 1
· p(S ∪ { j}). (11)
Symmetry of ϕp and linearity (Prop. 1) imply
ϕ
p
i
(vX) =
∑
{i, j}⊆T⊆N
λT,X · ϕ
p
i
(uT) =
∑
{i, j}⊆T⊆N
λT,X · ϕ
p
j
(uT) = ϕ
p
j
(vX). (12)
The expressions for ϕ
p
j
(uT) analogous to eq. (11) involve identical first and second
summands. Cancelling these in eq. (12) yields
∑
{i, j}⊆T⊆N
∑
S⊆N\{i, j}
λT,X ·
1
|T \ S| − 1
·p(S∪{ j}) =
∑
{i, j}⊆T⊆N
∑
S⊆N\{i, j}
λT,X ·
1
|T \ S| − 1
·p(S∪{i}). (13)
Changing the order of summation, noting |T \ S| − 1 = 1 + |T \ S \ {i, j}| if {i, j} ⊆ T, and
invoking eq. (10) reduces this to p(X ∪ { j}) = p(X ∪ {i}). This proves the claim. 
As a direct corollary to Propositions 1–3 and Shapley (1953), we obtain a full
characterization of when the Shapley value has a roll call interpretation:
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Theorem 1 ϕp(v) = ϕ(v) for all coalitional games v if and only if players’ cooperation choices
are exchangeable under p.
It is clear from the proof of Proposition 3 that coincidence of ϕp and ϕ in Theorem 1
could be restricted to any subclass of games which includes basis {uT}, such as simple
games.
The marginal contribution of player i in roll call R defined in eq. (4) is key to
interpreting ϕ
p
i
(v). It is possible to give rather general economic meaning to it in terms
of a player’s effect on both the created and the rescinded surplus associated with
formation of a coalition S ⊆ N.
To us the roll call interpretation of the Shapley value is most appealing for simple
voting games. Then, for a given joint distribution p that describes the “yes”-or-“no”
inclinations of voters and considering uniformly random sequences of players being
called, ϕ
p
i
(v) is the probability of player i being pivotal: either conclusively passing
the proposal or putting the final nail in its coffin. Pivot probabilities are widely
applied in order to assess how given voting rules translate into a distribution of voting
power in various decision bodies (e.g., shareholdermeetings, the USElectoral College,
EU Council of Ministers, IMF Board of Directors, etc.; cf. Napel 2019). They also are
of interest in other environments that involve binary variables, such as in reliability
analysis of components or factors whose functionality is critical to a technical system
or success of a project.
Theorem 1 characterizes all scenarios such that the Shapley value captures players’
pivot probabilities. These include the textbook case of all players voting “yes” as well
as independent votes with a probability x ∈ [0, 1] for “yes”. But they go considerably
beyond: the Shapley value equals pivot probabilities in roll calls if and only if votes
are exchangeable.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
The proof draws on the following two combinatorial claims with n ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}:
Claim 1
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
· (−1)k =

1 if n = 0,
0 if n ≥ 1.
Proof This follows from
∑0
k=0
(0
k
)
· (−1)k =
(0
0
)
= 1 and the binomial theorem, i.e.,
0 = (1 − 1)n =
∑n
k=0
(n
k
)
· (−1)k for n ≥ 1. 
Claim 2
(a)
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
·
(−1)k
k + 1
=
1
n + 1
,
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(b)
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
·
(−1)k
k + x
=
n!∏n
k=0(x + k)
for all x ∈ (0,∞),
(c)
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
·
(−1)k
k + 1 + x
=
n!∏n
k=0(1 + x + k)
for all x ∈ (−1,∞).
Proof Consider the following polynomial of degree at most n
f (x) =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
· (−1)k ·
∏
0≤ j≤n : j,k
(x + 1 + j). (14)
For every i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}we have
f (−i − 1) =
(
n
i
)
· (−1)i ·
∏
0≤ j≤n : j,i
(x + 1 + j) =
(
n
i
)
· (−1)i · (−1)ii! · (n − i)! = n! (15)
since each product in eq. (14) contains one factor ( j − i) = 0 when k , i. A polynomial
of degree at most n that equals n! for n + 1 distinct x must be constant; so f (x) = n!.
Part (c) then follows from division by
∏n
k=0(1 + x + k). Setting x = 0 in part (c) yields
(a). Part (b) follows from (c) by a transformation of variable. 
Now consider matricesM andM−1 with
MR,S =
1
1 + |R \ S|
and M−1R,S =
(
m + 1
m + |R \ S|
)
· (−1)|S∆R| (16)
for all R, S ⊆ G = {1, . . . ,m} and let us show that
(
M ·M−1
)
R,S
=
∑
U⊆GMR,U ·M
−1
U,S
equals
the 2m × 2m-identity matrix. All terms involving M−1
U,S
with |U \ S| ≥ 2 vanish since(m
k
)
= 0 for k > m. The remaining terms either involve U ⊆ Swith |U \ S| = 0 (implying( m+1
m+|U\S|
)
= m+1); orU such that |U \S| = 1 implying
( m+1
m+|U\S|
)
= 1 and |U∆S| = 1+ |S\U|.
So (
M ·M−1
)
R,S
=
∑
U⊆S
m + 1
1 + |R \U|
· (−1)|S\U| +
∑
U⊆G : |U\S|=1
−1
1 + |R \U|
· (−1)|S\U|
=
∑
U⊆S
m + 1
1 + |R \U|
· (−1)|S\U| +
∑
U⊆S
∑
l∈G\S
−1
1 + |R \ (U ∪ {l})|
· (−1)|S\U|(17)
Let us use the abbreviations a = |R ∩ S| and b = |S \ R|, so that a + b = |S|. With this we
compute ∑
U⊆S
m + 1
1 + |R \U|
· (−1)|S\U|
=
a∑
i=0
b∑
j=0
(
a
i
)(
b
j
)
·
m + 1
1 + |R| − i
· (−1)|S|−i− j
=
a∑
i=0
(
a
i
)
·
m + 1
1 + |R| − i
· (−1)|S|−i ·

b∑
j=0
(
b
j
)
· (−1) j
 (18)
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and
∑
U⊆S
∑
l∈G\S
−1
1 + |R \ (U ∪ {l})|
· (−1)|S\U|
=
∑
l∈G\S
a∑
i=0
b∑
j=0
(
a
i
)(
b
j
)
·
−1
1 + |R \ {l}| − i
· (−1)|S|−i− j
= −
∑
l∈G\S
a∑
i=0
(
a
i
)
·
1
1 + |R \ {l}| − i
· (−1)|S|−i ·

b∑
j=0
(
b
j
)
· (−1) j
 . (19)
If b > 0, corresponding to S * R, Claim 1 implies
(
M ·M−1
)
R,S
= 0
It remains to consider b = 0, corresponding to S ⊆ R. Claim 1 then implies(∑b
j=0
(b
j
)
· (−1) j
)
= 1, which simplifies expressions (18) and (19). The case |U \ S| = 1
captured by (19) splits into x := |R \ S| subcases where l ∈ G \ S is member of R, and
m − |S| − x subcases where l is neither member of S nor of R. Noting, moreover, that
|R| = x + |S| we can use this case distinction to write (17) as
(
M ·M−1
)
R,S
=
|S|∑
i=0
(
|S|
i
)
·
(m + 1) · (−1)|S|−i
1 + x + |S| − i
−
|S|∑
i=0
(
|S|
i
)
·
(m − |S| − x) · (−1)|S|−i
1 + x + |S| − i
−
|S|∑
i=0
(
|S|
i
)
·
x · (−1)|S|−i
x + |S| − i
=
|S|∑
i=0
(
|S|
i
)
·
(|S| + x + 1) · (−1)|S|−i
1 + x + |S| − i
−
|S|∑
i=0
(
|S|
i
)
·
x · (−1)|S|−i
x + |S| − i
= (|S| + x + 1) ·
|S|∑
k=0
(
|S|
k
)
·
(−1)k
1 + x + k
− x ·
|S|∑
k=0
(
|S|
k
)
·
(−1)k
x + k
. (20)
For x = 0, i.e., S = R, Claim 2(a) then gives
(
M ·M−1
)
R,R
= 1. For x > 0, i.e., S ( R,
Claims 2(b) and 2(c) give
(
M ·M−1
)
R,S
= (|S| + x + 1) ·
m!∏|S|
k=0
(1 + x + k)
− x ·
m!∏|S|
k=0
(x + k)
= 0. (21)
In summary, we have (
M ·M−1
)
R,S
=

1 if R = S,
0 otherwise.
(22)

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